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BOOK REVIEWS
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, by Merold Westphal. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm 
B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2014. 294 pages. $35.00 (paperback).
MARK A. TIETJEN, University of West Georgia
In the past two decades there has been a surge of interest in the concept of 
love in Søren Kierkegaard’s thought. Monographs like M. Jamie Ferreira’s 
Love’s Grateful Striving (2001) and C. Stephen Evans’s Kierkegaard’s Ethic of 
Love (2004) and collections of essays like the Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 
(1998) and International Kierkegaard Commentary, v.16 (2000), have drawn 
attention to Kierkegaard’s most important book on Christian ethics, Works 
of Love, and located the mother of virtues as a central concept within 
Kierkegaard’s vast authorship.
If there is another theological virtue given equal if not greater airtime in 
Kierkegaard, it would be faith, and this should come as no surprise when 
one recognizes Kierkegaard’s stated intention of reintroducing Christianity 
into Christendom. However, there has been less dedicated attention to this 
concept, despite its prominent place in so many of Kierkegaard’s most im-
portant writings. In Fear and Trembling, one is introduced to the idea of faith 
as an absolute relation to the absolute. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym paraphrases faith as an objective uncertainty to 
which one is committed with the utmost passion and inwardness. And in 
The Sickness unto Death, faith, contraposed to despair, is a transparent, rest-
ful relation to God.
In Merold Westphal’s Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, we find these and 
other conceptions and nuances of faith carefully articulated, distinguished, 
and clarified. The book is organized in three sections, each one devoted 
to the work of one particular pseudonym. The first and largest concerns 
the lone work of the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio and Kierkegaard’s 
most well-known work, Fear and Trembling. Given the depth, breadth, and 
quality of these chapters, this near-half of the volume bests many stand-
alone commentaries on Fear and Trembling in its ability to make readable 
Kierkegaard’s highly challenging and often misread masterpiece. Section 
two is devoted to the writings of Johannes Climacus (Philosophical Fragments 




and Concluding Unscientific Postscript), while section three takes up Anti-
Climacus’s books (The Sickness unto Death and Practice in Christianity). The 
chapters that comprise each section take as their topic a particular thesis or 
conceptual remark about faith, giving us twelve in all. (There is a thirteenth 
chapter, an “interlude,” which I will return to shortly.) These include the 
following: faith as the task of a lifetime, faith as the highest passion, faith as 
a leap and a striving, and faith as contemporaneity with Christ—without 
offense. A simple glance at the table of contents’ list of these theses immedi-
ately conveys the complexity of faith in Kierkegaard’s thought and, conse-
quently, the very need for a work that attends to that complexity.
Those curious about Kierkegaard’s view of faith or generally interested 
in developing in Christian faith themselves may find the issue of pseud-
onymity in Kierkegaard confusing, intimidating, or distracting. For these 
readers, Westphal helpfully explains this unusual authorial method. For 
the Kierkegaard scholar, Westphal goes a step further by justifying the 
title of his book—Kierkegaard’s concept of faith—and succinctly defeating 
stalling worries that would keep analysis of faith from moving forward. 
In the course of this discussion in the book’s introduction, he offers en-
couragement to the reader hoping to grow in faith, pointing out how for 
Kierkegaard, the very process of writing was itself a process of spiritual 
development and instruction. Kierkegaard believed that God reared him 
through his writings. Thus, to read with an eye toward appropriation is 
the right way to go, whereas those whose chief aim is some increase in 
knowledge, even theological knowledge, are not just reading Kierkegaard 
wrongly, but Westphal wrongly.
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith is vintage Westphal in its emphasis on Kier-
kegaard’s work as ideology critique. Echoing his 1987 Kierkegaard’s Cri-
tique of Reason and Society (Penn State), Westphal argues that Kierkegaard’s 
harsh words about reason bear more resemblance to Jesus’s harsh words 
to the Pharisees than they do the irrationalist caricatures still perpetuated 
about Kierkegaard. “Instead of assuming that Christianity must somehow 
show itself to be reasonable, it is the ideological concept of reason that 
needs to show us why we should adopt it. Does not every established 
order become evil just to the degree that it absolutizes itself, confuses it-
self with God or the kingdom of God?” (96). He helpfully expands and 
updates this insight by reminding us that the natural sciences (in our day) 
rather than speculative philosophy (in Kierkegaard’s day) are more likely 
to fill the role of self-legitimizing arbiter of what counts as reason. Thus, 
to the metaphysical naturalism often assumed in scientific inquiry, “faith 
cannot submit without losing its own soul” (225).
Westphal weighs in on and presents refreshing perspectives on some 
old debates about Kierkegaard, such as the claim that he is a volitionalist 
(that beliefs are something that one can will) and that he is the father of ex-
istentialism. Concerning the latter, he argues that for Kierkegaard existence 
is “a technical term for the distinctive temporality of human life,” and thus 
when we think of existence in light of the notion of “becoming a Christian,” 
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we can qualify the epithet’s meaning (167). Westphal also engages some of 
the newer debates: that Kierkegaard is a proto-deconstructionist (see the 
introduction) and that he is some sort of divine command theorist.
The latter topic is addressed at length in the interlude, the chapter im-
mediately following chapter 3: faith as obedience to divine commands. 
While I cannot go into the arguments in detail, let me offer a few observa-
tions that speak to the strategies and quality of the book as a whole. First, 
to the aid of non-philosophers, Westphal begins with a clear and accessible 
primer on epistemology and hermeneutics, thus introducing figures like 
Reid, Moore, Chisholm, Gadamer, and Derrida and sketching general po-
sitions within which he can situate the text’s claims. The issue at stake is of 
course the Akedah, Abraham’s binding of Isaac, and the many problems of 
knowledge, trust, and obedience that story raises. The dialogue Westphal 
stages between the text of Fear and Trembling and these other interlocu-
tors is not merely an exercise in drawing interesting historical connections 
(though it does that) but also one that directly addresses the very crucial 
and common worries everyday people of faith ask themselves when they 
read Genesis 22: what exactly does God promise and command Abraham, 
and how am I to relate these promises and commands to my own situa-
tion? Ever mindful of these basic and essential concerns, Westphal enters 
the current debate himself, offering nothing short of a literature review of 
recent books that steer attention away from the importance of God’s com-
mands and Abraham’s obedience to those commands. Those interested in 
where Westphal lands will have to read for themselves. Suffice it to say that 
the chapter perfectly exemplifies Westphal’s remarkable ability to speak to 
novices and seasoned scholars almost at the same time, and to move schol-
arly conversations forward all the while making edifying remarks about 
faith with clear implications for those seeking spiritual direction. One of 
the most careful remarks of the book can be found in his discussion of 
the objection to divine commands as arbitrary, an objection to divine com-
mands that many college sophomores can recite from memory. Contrary 
to the way the objection usually goes, arbitrariness does not necessarily 
connote “irrationalism, despotism, or blind fanaticism,” and he illustrates 
this through the amount of allowance a child might earn upon perform-
ing certain chores. No general rational principle supports a precise dollar 
amount; thus in a sense that amount is arbitrary. Yet parents who arbi-
trarily assign $5 for taking out the trash are not irrational, despotic, or 
fanatical. God’s commands may follow no rational principle we know, yet 
that arbitrariness (perspectival arbitrariness, I would add) does not entail 
the commands are irrational (to God), despotic, or fanatical.
If Westphal’s writing is instructive for newcomers to epistemology 
and hermeneutics, it is instructive also for newcomers to the history of 
philosophy, something true of every book of his I know. Consider the fol-
lowing gem: “Christianity is better off to have the Lessings of the world 
reject it outright than to have the Hegels of the world (and the Kants, 
for that matter) put it through the filter of (some version of) reason as 
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recollection and given back to us as the new, improved, reasonable ver-
sion of Christianity” (199). The ease with which Westphal moves between 
conversations among philosophers ancient and postmodern, analytic and 
continental, highlights the extent to which many of these categories are 
mostly superficial distinctions we use to remain in our ideological bun-
kers. Westphal does not seem impressed by these categorizations, only by 
the ideas themselves, and readers will find his non-partisan presentation 
of them contagious.
In the end, one of the most winning features of Westphal’s book is its 
faithfulness to Kierkegaard’s faithfulness to a biblical picture of faith. A 
prime example comes when Westphal explores in chapter 8 faith as the 
happy passion that overcomes offense. Working through the concept of 
absolute paradox—a term that signifies the God-human Jesus Christ—
Westphal concludes: “In other words, the absolute paradox is the doctrine 
of the incarnation combined with the doctrine of the atonement, which 
presupposes the doctrine of the fall and culminates in the doctrine of rec-
onciliation” (151).
Westphal’s monograph goes a long way toward remedying the vacuum 
of work on Kierkegaardian faith, offering, among many other things, a 
welcome antidote to the common caricatures of Kierkegaardian faith as an 
irrational leap. It is only regrettable that the conversation is primarily con-
fined to these five pseudonymous works, when in fact discussions of faith 
can be found behind every nook and cranny of Kierkegaard’s vast author-
ship—signed writings, journals, and so on. One can only hope for a sequel.
The Severity of God: Religion and Philosophy Reconceived, by Paul Moser. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 237 pages. $29.99 (paperback).
JACOB L. GOODSON, Southwestern College, Winfield, KS
In his book The Severity of God, Paul Moser’s primary argument is that 
the academic discipline of philosophy must become Christ-centered in its 
pursuit of the love of wisdom. The way to achieve this is for the field of 
the philosophy of religion to develop the notion of “the severity of God”: 
“only a severe God would be worthy of worship, but such a God would be 
severely redemptive and thus vigorously transformative in a manner that 
overturns business as usual in religion, theology, philosophy, and related 
disciplines” (9). Moser contends that philosophers of religion ought to be 
more careful with its “object” of study—God—and the question becomes 
what kind of God is worthy of our philosophical investigations. The God 
who remains “worthy of worship” is the same God who philosophers of 
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